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Elections to the Senate are rarely a topic of deep analysis by media or researchers. 
 e Upper House of the Parliament is not a place where key political decisions are 
made.  e Government, which is appointed by the majority of the Lower House, the 
Sejm, is the center of Polish political life. Experience show that the political situation 
in the Senate is much more stable than in the Sejm. From 1997, parties which won 
elections to the Sejm always had a majority in the Senate, although none of these 
parties had an independent majority in the Sejm.  e 2007 elections crown this trend 
– only one mandate in the Senate was given to a candidate who did not come from 
the winning party or any main opposition parties. Every  # h mandate in the Lower 
House was given to smaller parties.  e purpose of this analysis is to  nd an answer 
to the question on what leads to such results.
1. SENATE ELECTIONS
It is worts beginning from the issue of classifying the Senate ordinacy. Literature 
review suggests that there is a wide acceptance of describing Polish electoral system 
as a majority rule which uses not one but two, three, or even four mandate electoral 
precincts. Dieter Nohlen describes such a system as a sub-type of the classical major-
ity rule system1. However, many researchers point that such a voting system should 
1 D. Nohlen, Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny, Scholar, Warszawa 2004, p. 165.
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rather be referred to as “block voting,” which explicitly distinguishes it from other 
type of majority rule voting2. 
Block voting which is applied in Poland during Senate elections is rarely seen 
outside Poland. Today, only such countries as Kuweit, Laos, Liban or Syria use 
a similar system. It was also used in parliamentary elections in  ailand and the 
Philippines until 1997 when it was modi ed due to the results it had brought.3 
Jack Haman classi ed block voting to quasi-proportional formulas and not major-
ity rule formulas.4  is term was used to describe a phenomenon of electing one 
candidate from a list of many candidates. At the same time, Haman points out that 
block voting is closer to a  rst-past-the-post method than a proportional method.
 is observation is important mainly because quite o# en in the debate over the 
ongoing modi cations of the Polish political system the Senate elections are used as 
a positive example which gives a clearly de ned majority but also as a negative 
example of how, despite the election results, party connections in uence the  nal 
outcome. Some analysts regard Senate elections as a an example of a system which 
allows independent candidates to obtain a mandate. Public debates frequently point 
out to senator Henryk Stokłosa, who was a Senator for many years and who got 
arrested many years a# er his mandate expired. Based on this example accusations 
are made that a majority rule electoral system can lead to a dominance of such 
candidates. 
International Institute, IDEA, in its handbook, Electoral System Design, pointed 
out to several weaknesses of such a system; political defragmentation, rivalry between 
candidates from the same political party, and lack of proportional method.5  e 
strongest point of such a system, according to the same handbook, is an opportunity 
to vote for particular candidates. Also, the block system awards those parties that 
reveal greatest internal cohesion and good organization.
If we assume that the electorate of political parties is fully loyal and disciplined, 
we can presuppose that the results in block voting will be the same as results if the 
 rst-past-the-post, meaning the winner takes it all, formula was used. 
On the national scale, the disproportion of block voting may be higher than in 
the case of one mandate.6  is could happen because larger precincts can even out 
geographical di erences in support towards a given party. Haman, however, points 
out that in some situation such a voting system will allow a representative of a minor-
2 A. Reynolds, B. Reilly, A. Ellis, Electoral System Design, IDEA, Sztokholm, 2005 p. 44.
3 Ibidem.
4 J. Haman, Demokracja, Decyzje, Wybory, Scholar, Warszawa 2003, pp. 166–168.
5 A. Reynolds, B. Reilly, A. Ellis, Electoral System…, op.cit.
6 P. Norris, Electoral Engineering, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 48.
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ity to obtain a mandate.  is happens when the electorate is not loyal to its party and 
some voters are willing to divide their votes. Secondly, block voting enables a creation 
of informal coalitions of smaller parties. Each party nominates one candidate and 
o  cially agree to transfer votes. In such a situation smaller parties have a chance to 
win mandates. Haman analyzed election results from 2001. He points out that 
although the – SLD obtained more mandates than other parties it did not win in all 
precincts where it had an absolute majority. On the other hand, the Alliance obtained 
mandates in those precincts where Block Senat 2001 (need to explain the name) lost 
mandates due to weaker discipline. Herman also points out that smaller parties, such 
as PSL (Polish Peasant Party) Self-Defence, or the League of Polish Families, managed 
to keep a few mandates each despite the fact that none of them had a dominant 
position in any precincts. Haman points out that in the block voting system factors 
such as organizational skills, loyalty, disciplined voters, and  nally proper strategy in 
selecting and nominating candidates, are very important and can in uence the elec-
tions’ results. A similar example is given by – Cox who describes the consequences 
of dividing votes in the 19th century England when many electoral precincts would 
chose two members of the House of Commons.  en, as a result of dividing votes 
between candidates from di erent parties, it was possible that a party which domi-
nated in a given precinct would not obtain two mandates but one.  e second 
mandate was given to the opposition, if it only nominated one candidate.7 
2. USING VOTES
 e fact that everybody has two, three or four votes, does not mean they need to 
use them.  e National Electoral Committee does not gather statistical data on how 
many votes are made by individual voters. If a voter in a four-mandate precinct chose 
only one candidate his vote is treated the same way as the one of a voter who chose 
four candidates. Nonetheless, such data can be obtained when we compare the 
number of votes made for all Senate candidates with the number of votes which were 
made in a given precinct.8 
When we look at this problem at the national scale we notice that only 76 per cent 
of the allowed votes were actually used. It means that ever voter did not use at least one 
of the votes it was allowed. Using allowed votes depends on the precinct size. In two-
mandate precincts the level of using allowed votes was estimated at 79 per cent (21 per 
7 G.W. Cox, Making Votes Count, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, p. 43.
8 All estimations based on page strony wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl
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cent was not used at all). It means that, for example, two out of every  ve voters chose 
only one candidate and three chose two candidates. In the case of three mandate 
precincts 72.5 per cent of allowed votes were not used.  is could be explained by 
a number of con gurations – di erent electoral behaviour (or di erent behaviour of 
voters) can lead to di erent results. It can turn out, for example, that only one out of 
 ve voters chose three candidates whereas the remaining four chose two candidates. 
Such result can be also obtained when three voters out of  ve will use all votes allowed 
but two will choose one candidate.  ere are only two four precincts – in both cases 
voters used 74 per cent of allowed votes. Here the number of possible con gurations 
of behaviours leading to such a result is even larger. Basically, such an e ect can be 
achieved when out of every voters two used four votes each, and the third voter used 
only one vote. 
What can lead to such a phenomenon – why voters chose fewer candidates than 
they are allowed? Why do they give up their right? Two hypotheses are possible here. 
One of the hypotheses states: such electoral behaviour can be explained by the 
complexity of the system and because in other elections, for example in council 
elections or parliamentary elections (?) (basiacally in all other elections) they have 
only one voice.  ey transfer the same mechanism, the same logic, to block voting 
without noticing a di erence in the mechanism itself. In fact, such voting is a result 
of lack of awareness of how a given voting system works and what are the voter’s 
rights in this system.
A completely di erent explanation is also possible. If, during the elections, which 
are run in accordance with block voting, a voter who chooses only one candidate, 
whose victory is in his interest, then the only logical (good) strategy is to choose 
only one candidate and give up voting for others. Each vote given to other candidates 
increases the probability that they will beat that only candidate.  is means, if a voter 
has only one preference, and the other candidates are indi erent to him, in such 
a situation the number of given votes is limited.  ere are two explanations to such 
a situation: either a very low level of voters’ competence or a very high level of 
voters’ competence. A competence, which notices very subtle, and at  rst sight invis-
ible, voting mechanisms which characterize (accompany) block voting. Indirect 
explainantions are also possible – the voter notices only a limited number of can-
didates whom he/she trusts.  e voter does not trust the remaining candidates and 
does not give them his/her vote without taking into consideration negative conse-
quences of not voting for other candidates. In this way, the voter gives up the ability 
to show his/her preference by showing that equal negative attitude towards all 
remaining candidates.  e phenomenon of a limited use of votes inevitably in u-
ences the results – this is another factor considered in the analysis of support for 
individual candidates. 
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3. MAJORITY RULE IN ACTION
Only six out of one hundred elected senators received support of the absolute 
majority of the voters. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of support towards can-
didates to the Senate who won the elections – from the ones with the largest support 
to the ones with the least support. A candidate which received the largest number 
of votes gained support of 63 per cent. Slightly more than 20 per cent of votes allowed 
a candidate to obtain a mandate, which is regarded as the least support received. 
Such electoral outcome (result) is very far from the absolute majority and suggests 
a very large fragmentation of votes in a precinct. Between these two extremes are the 
results of other winning candidates. While 14 senators received a support in the range 
of 40 to 50 per cent, majority of winning candidates (51 senators) received a support 
in the range of 30 to 40 per cent. Voters’ support of less than 30 per cent was given 
to 29 senators. Fragmentation of votes did not take place in all precincts. However, 
in great majority, meaning in 80 per cent of all precincts, candidates lacked at least 
10 percent to receive an absolute majority. An average winning candidate would 
receive 35 per cent of electoral support.
In some precincts a  ercer competition took place between a smaller number of 
candidates while in some precincts the number of strong candidates was larger. In 
e ect, 75 per cent of candidates who did not get elected received a larger support 
than the senator who was elected to the Senate with the lowest support of 20 per 
cent.  e strongest candidate who did not receive a mandate received 32 per cent of 
votes. Such support, however, was not enough in the precinct in which he run, 
although in other precincts it would give him a smashing victory. 
Rys. 1. Support for senators
Source: own estimation based on wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl
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One can look at the support which the winning senators receive not from the 
perspective of the voters but from the perspective of the cast votes keeping in mind 
that a signi cant share of voters casts only a part of votes they are allowed. In this 
way, inevitably, the number of votes for one candidate can be reduced signi -
cantly. 
In a one-mandate precinct the percent of votes given to all candidates totals to 
100. In a multi-mandate precinct, in which voters do not use all votes they are 
allowed, votes do not total to 100 multiplied by a number of mandates to win.  at 
is why, in these precincts it is much harder to receive a support of more than 50 per 
cent of voters than in case of one-mandate precinct. 
4. PARTY IDENTIFICATION
 e importance of party identi cation can be assessed by comparing the results 
of elections to Sejm and Senate. If the statement about a greater personalization of 
Senate elections is true, then a signi cant discrepancy should appear.  e  rst step 
in the analysis is to compare the number of received votes in both precincts by the 
candidates from one party. In the case of elections to Sejm it is very simple.  ese 
results are available on the website of the National Elections Commission where 
the total number (or  nal result) at the national level is provided. In the case of 
Senate elections to obtain such data requires a detailed calculation of results in all 
precinct (table 1). 
In the Sejm elections, the Civic Platform received 41.5 per cent of votes, a total 
number candidates received in the Senate elections is lower by about 2.5 per cent: 
39.1 per cent of all votes received in the Senate elections. Law and Justice received 
Tab.1. A comparisan of party results in Sejm and Senate elections
Sejm – votes for 
lists
Senate
sum of votes for 
candidates
average score of 
a candidate
PO 41,5% 39,1% 33,6%
PiS 32,1% 31,4% 27,0%
LiD 13,2% 14,6% 15,0%
PSL 8,9% 8,8% 14,2%
Source: own estimation based on wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl
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32.1 per cent in the Sejm elections and 31.4 per cent in the Senate election, which is 
less than one percentage point. Liberal and Democrats received 13.2 per cent in the 
Sejm elections and 14.6 in the Senate elections, about 1.4 percentage points more. 
In the case of Polish Peasant Party there is the least di erence 8.9 per cent to Sejm 
and 8.8 per cent to Senate. A comparison of these results suggest a very similar 
tendency in elections to both houses of the Parliament.  e di erence isnot larger 
than 2.5 percentage points. Such comparison would suggest that there is a strong 
correlation between these results. However, a more careful analysis leads to some 
modi cation of this thesis. 
Another set of data worth analyzing are the votes candidates to Senate received 
in individual precincts in comparison with the results parties received in elections 
to Sejm.  e candidates of the wining Civic Platform received, on average, 33.6 per 
cent of votes given in a given precincts, meaning about 7 percent less than what the 
party received in the Sejm elections.  e Law and Justice candidates received, on 
average, 27 per cent of votes, meaning about 5 per cent less than in Sejm elections. 
Candidates from LiD received 15 per cent as compared to 13.2 per cent in the elec-
tions to Sejm. In the case of the Polish Peasants’ Party it was 14.2 per cent versus 
almost 9 per cent in the Sejm elections. It is apparent that the support for the candi-
dates from the two strongest parties is lower in the elections to Sejm, in the case of 
LiD the results are very similar, whereas in the case of the Polish Peasant Party the 
results of the candidates are signi cantly higher than those in the elections to Sejm. 
If, a er a closer look, the exceptional correlation between the number of votes 
received by parties in elections to Sejm and Senate is less obvious then a question 
emerges regarding the correlation between the results of Senate elections with the 
results from the elections to Sejm.  is would be another measure of voters’ party 
loyalty.  e main indicator here is very straightforward.  e correlation between the 
 nal results that were obtained by the candidates in Senate elections and the support 
that their party received in the same precinct was 0,99.  is is a very strong correla-
tion – it would suggest that the support for a candidate in the elections to the Senate 
is in almost 90 per cent explained by a general support for his/her party in a given 
precinct. However,  gure 2 suggests that there is no straight relationship between 
a support for a given party and support for its candidate in the Senate elections.  e 
candidates of a party with a much smaller support usually get a better result than the 
party itself. However, in a great majority of cases when a party received support of 
30 per cent or more, support for candidates to Senate was much smaller than the 
party’s results in Sejm elections.
9 Exactly 0,89888.
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Rys. 2. Support for a Senate candidate and support for the party
Source: own estimation based on wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl
It is worth to analyzing this support with a reference to particular parties. Such 
high correlation when controlled for which party candidates come from, decreases 
signi cantly.  e biggest fall takes place in the case of the Civic Platform. In the case 
of its candidates the correlation reaches 0.83, meaning not much less than a correla-
tion for all candidates. In the case of Law and Justice such correlation reaches 0.77, 
meaning that the results achieved by the candidates of this party will depend on the 
actual results of this party. A much smaller coe#  cient is in the case of candidates 
from smaller parties. In the case of LiD it is 0.53 while in the case of the Polish 
Peasants’ Party is 0.31.  ese are very strong correlations, however not as overbear-
ing as it is in the case of a general coe#  cient. It seems that this direct high correlation 
is, in part, a result of a defragmentation of results of a given party, and, in part, it is 
a correlation with their general size and not a particular result. If we create a variable 
which would assign to each party a number which represents its place in the elections 
to Sejm (from 1 to 4) then support for particular candidates to the Senate is correlated 
with a corresponding value of 0.73. However, there is a clear regularity which passes 
the simple correlation in the relation between the candidate’s results in the Senate 
elections and support for his party in a given precinct.  e answer to this question 
will be sought in the remaining part of this analysis.
 e next step in the analysis is to compare di erences between the results obtained 
by the Senate candidates and results their parties received in the precincts (table 2). 
 is di erence depends on the party in question.  e candidates of the Civic Plat-
form, the winning party in the Sejm elections but also a party which received the 
biggest number of mandates in the Senate, received, on average, about 7 per cent 
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points less than this party received in the Sejm elections in the same precincts.  is 
is a decline in support calculated as a percentage of the number of votes received. 
When we compare it with the results that the party received in a given precinct than 
it means that, on average, 18 per cent of the party’s voters did not vote for its party’s 
candidates to the Senate. A similar result can be obtained for Law and Justice. Can-
didates to the Senate from this party received, on average 6 percentage pointsless 
than their party received in the precincts in which they run. When the data is com-
pared to the results obtained by Law and Justice it turns out that 17 per cent of the 
party’s voters did not vote for its candidates in the Senate elections. Such a com-
parison means that there is a small  ow, a small degree of disloyalty, which is under-
stood as voting for di erent candidates in Sejm and Senate elections.  is disloyalty 
could be larger if, for example, a number of voters voting for the Civic Platform to 
Sejm would vote for Law and Justice to the Senate and the other way round: when 
Law and Justice voters to Sejm would vote for the Civic Platform to the Senate. 
However, this disloyalty is not smaller than the values presented.  e case is com-
pletely di erent in the case of smaller parties. In the Senate elections, candidates from 
LiD received, on average, 2 percentage points more than their party in the Sejm 
elections, which when compared to the general support for LiD means that their 
candidates to Senate got one   h of votes more. In the case of the Polish Peasant 
Party these percentage points are even higher.  eir candidates received, on average, 
3 percentage points more, meaning half more votes in comparison to the support 
that their party received from voters.
Tab. 2. A comparison of party candidates’ results in election for the Sejm and the Senate
an avwerage di erence between a candidate’s support 
for the Sejm and his/her support for the Senate
absolute simple
PO –7% –18%
PiS –6% –17%
LiD 2% 20%
PSL 3% 52%
Source: own estimation based on wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl
In e ect, of course these are average values, however, in the case of the Civic 
Platform 12 per cent of its candidates received a larger support than their party in 
the Sejm elections and yet 88 per cent of the candidates received a smaller support 
than their party. In the case of Law and Justice 11 per cent of candidates received 
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a larger support than their party and 89 per cent received a smaller support than 
their party. An almost opposite trend characterized LiD and the Polish Peasants’ 
Party where 73 and 70 per cent of candidates respectively had a larger support than 
their party in the Sejm elections and 27 and 30 per cent of candidates, respectively, 
had a smaller support.
5. REMAINING CANDIDATES 
 e hypothesis which should be considered is the in uence of independent 
candidates. ! e public as well as the researchers consider majority voting system to 
be more personalized and giving a better chance to non-party candidates. ! e results 
of the 2007 Senate race do not support this hypothesis. Candidates from other par-
ties than the four winning ones received 6.1 per cent of the winning votes. A little 
more than half of these votes got candidates from parties which already had a seat 
in the Sejm in the previous term. ! ese were candidates from Self-Defence and 
League of Polish Families. In the case of the latter, the name of the party was changed 
into the League of Polish Right (in Polish language the abbreviation remained the 
same – LPR), which was created by the League of Polish Families, the Right of the 
Polish Republic, and the Union of Real Politics. In the Senate race, however, the 
candidates of these three parties run under three di# erent aegis. Only Marek Jurek 
from the Right of the Polish Republic received a 19 per cent support in the precinct 
of Piotrków Trybunalski. However, it was not enough to give him a seat in the Parlia-
ment. 
! e remaining candidates which were not a  liated with any of the parties already 
in the Parliament received less than 3 per cent of the votes at the national level. 
Nonetheless, one of these candidates received a vote. It was Włodzimierz Cimosze-
wicz who ran in the precinct of Białystok. He ran as an independent candidate 
although he was known to the public as a long member of the Democratic Le&  
Alliance (which in the last elections was part of the LiD coalition), a former Prime 
Minister, Minister of Foreign A# airs, and Speaker of the House. ! is case will be 
discussed in the later part of the analysis. Jaroslaw Lasecki in the Czestochowa 
precinct received 25 per cent of the votes, a number too small to give him a seat. He 
run as an independent candidate and a winner in previous elections. He ran as an 
independent candidate who, nonetheless, was involved in the parliamentary club of 
Law and Justice and who le&  the club a month before the elections.10 Nonetheless, 
the 6.1 per cent of votes received by the candidates who ran from other than the four 
10 Based on www.senat.gov.pl
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winning parties is a result only slightly higher than the one received by parties which 
did not win any seats in the Parliament. All these parties together received 4.3 per 
cent of the votes. Less then 3 per cent received by candidates without any party 
identi cation proves that these candidates do not play a signi cant role in the Senate 
race, especially since from these candidates the most successful ones were the ones 
who had an earlier party a  liation.
6. ORDER ON THE LIST
! e next problem is the importance of the position on the voting list and its 
relation to the outcome of the elections. ! e candidates to the Senate are placed on 
the list in the alphabetical order. ! is fact appears to have a signi cant importance 
to the outcome of the elections. In the case of the candidates which are lower on the 
list, who are the subsequent candidates of the same party, there is a signi cant decline 
in the number of votes received. An average candidate of the Civic Platform whose 
name was in the second position on the list, received 8 per cent fewer votes than his 
party colleague whose name was placed on a higher position. In the case of Law and 
Justice, such a loss reached, on average, 7 per cent of the votes. In the case of candi-
dates from LiD whose names were further down on the list was 11 per cent, however, 
it was the biggest in the case of the Polish Peasants’ Party – 19 per cent of the votes. 
For all candidates from the four main parties such loss was, on average 10 per cent 
of votes.
Where does this di erence come from? It seems this it is a result of dividing votes 
as well limited voting. It seems that a part of voters who are characterized by a high 
party loyalty, is indi erent towards which candidate they vote for. If they make one 
vote, they usually vote for the  rst candidate on this list. If they divide their votes 
towards candidates from di erent parties then it is usually designated towards the 
 rst candidate on the list.
It does not mean that the results are straightforward. Of course, there are candi-
dates which are on further places and received signi cantly better results than their 
colleagues whose names were placed higher on the list. ! is referred to people with 
a much more de ned public image, who, before, held public o  ces and were o# en 
present in the media.  e largest di erence is between the  rst and the second 
candidate, especially in the case of the Civic Platform and LiD. However, in the case 
of the Law and Justice and the Polish Peasants’ Party the di erence between the  rst 
and the second candidate and the second and the third were very similar. 
Such a phenomenon suggests that from the hypotheses explaining a smaller 
number of votes than a voter is allowed, a more probable is the one which explains 
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such voter behaviour by lack of awareness of law that allows a larger number of votes 
than a voter’s decision to vote only for a preferred candidate. It can be assumed that 
if the application of limited voting to practice was a conscious and rational choice 
of a strategy which is based on not voting for impartial candidates, then there would 
be no clear correlation between the number of votes and their appearance on the list. 
An alternative hypothesis which suggests that candidates who are better assessed by 
the voters are characterized by a last name which starts with an earlier letter of the 
alphabet doest not sound convincing. Such a correlation rather suggests that dividing 
votes among di erent candidates is more a result of sophisticated political views and 
voter’s position on the ideological scale of di erent political parties more than issues 
other.  is clear correlation between the position on the voting list suggests that 
voters who vote in such a way are not interested in the candidates and vote for 
parties. By doing so they chose the # rst candidate they notice on the list. However, 
in the majority of cases candidates whose names were in the later position on the list 
received fewer votes than the proceeding candidate. It indicates that there is a sig-
ni# cant group of voters who still prefer to chose a candidate they know regardless 
of his/her party preferences. " is is a subject for further analyses. It would be par-
ticularly useful to test the phenomenon of the incumbent advantage11.
7. PARTY STRATEGIES
While developing Jack Haman’s hypothesis that in the case of block voting a sig-
ni# cant importance is given to the choice of the strategy , meaning the choice of 
candidates, who are chosen by the party in a given precinct, it is worth analyzing how 
this problem has been solved by the four main parties in the 2007 Senate race. Evi-
dently aware of this problem political parties use two di! erent strategies. An opti-
mistic strategy is used when a party prepares a voting list where the number of 
candidates equals to the number of mandates in a given precinct. A pessimistic 
strategy means that a party nominates fewer candidates than there are seats to be 
won. None of the parties used an optimistic strategy in all precincts, although all 
parties used it in a considerable number of precincts. Here there is a big di! erence 
between large parties such as the Civic Platform and Law and Justice and smaller 
parties: LiD and the Polish Peasants’ Party. First of all, large parties nominate a larger 
number of candidates. " e Civic Platform provided 15 candidates while Law and 
11 P.R. Abramson, J.H. Aldrich, D.W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 
Election, CQ Press, Washington 2004, p. 200.
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Justice provided 13 candidates. LiD provided 29 candidates and the Polish Peasants’ 
Party 48 mandates. At the precinct level, the Civic Platform and Law and Justice, 
regardless of the precinct size, provided at most one candidate, while LiD and the 
Polish Peasants’ Party did not nominate anybody in some of the precincts. In the case 
of LiD, the party did not nominate any candidate in the Poznan precinct, while the 
Polish Peasants’ Party did not nominate any candidates in Łódź, Poznań, Nowy Sącz, 
Katowice i Legnica. In six of the three-mandate precincts the Polish Peasants’ Party 
nominated only one candidate. Similarly, LiD nominated only one candidate in four 
of the three-mandate precincts. In terms of two four-mandate precincts, Krakow and 
Warsaw, the Polish Peasants’ Party nominated only one candidate in each of these 
precincts. LiD nominated all four candidates in Warsaw but only two in Krakow.  e 
Civic Platform and Law and Justice behaved in a similar way: nominated four can-
didates in Krakow and one fewer in Warsaw. 
Even the motivation behind the adoption of the pessimistic strategy is to counter-
act the e ects of limited voting and division of votes, such behaviours do not refer 
to all voters. Loyal and conscious voters can, in such a situation, give up their right 
to make all votes they are allowed and by doing so they will lower the national level 
of votes usage. To test this phenomenon, correlations between the number of miss-
ing candidates and the amount of used votes in a given precinct was established.
Generally speaking, an incomplete list of candidates nominated by the party leads 
to a smaller number of used votes.  e correlation between used votes in particular 
precincts and the number of missing candidates in four main parties is 0.57. Each 
additional missing candidate lowers down the number of used votes in a given 
precinct. 
 e next problem related to optimistic and pessimistic strategies is the question 
on what basis these decisions are made. To answer this question a correlation between 
the number of candidates that the party nominated in a given precinct and the dif-
ference between the support towards this party and support towards the winning 
candidate in the precinct was measured. If the party won in a precinct than the 
di erence was 0. Such correlation was measured for four parties. First, the choice of 
strategy was compared to the election results from the 2005 Sejm race. Second, 
a comparison was made with the results of 2007 elections as a parameter which 
hypothetically parties could consider as a prediction of the shape of election results. 
In the case of the Civic Platform the correlation between the number of mandates 
and the di erence in 2005 was 0.3 while in the case of the Law and Justice it was 0.59. 
It is evident that Law and Justice associated the choice of the pessimistic strategy 
with the di erence between the results from di erent precincts. In precincts where 
the di erence was to the advantage to the Civic Platform, then the party would more 
frequently choose the pessimistic strategy. A similar di erence is in the case of the 
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2007 race. Here for the Civic Platform the coe!  cient was 0.26 while for Law and 
Justice it was 0.56. Despite similar values, it is worth underlining that the coe!  cients 
for 2005 are, in both cases, higher. It suggests that while designing a strategy parties 
referred more to election results from 2005 than to public opinion polls. In the case 
of parties who completely lost the elections, that is LiD and the Polish Peasants’ Party, 
these coe!  cients amount to 0.35 for LiD in 2005 and 0.59 for the Polish Peasants’ 
Party. Similarly to Law and Justice, the Polish Peasants’ Party took the 2005 results 
into consideration. LiD took the 2005 results only slightly more seriously than the 
Civic Platform. For these two parties, in 2007, these coe!  cients are 0.27 and 0.56 
respectively.  erefore, in this case we have a similar phenomenon to that of larger 
parties. If any indicators were taken into consideration, these were usually the results 
from 2005 than any prognoses for 2007. It appears that parties made rational choice 
in reference to limiting the number of candidates they nominated. High indicators 
of the correlation suggest an awareness of the problem which is generated by the 
current system. Nonetheless, although in many cases the 2005 elections conditioned 
the adopted strategy this subordination to previous results was not full. In each party 
there were cases where a di erent strategy was chosen than the previous results would 
indicate. 
8. POLITICAL RESULTS OF A STRATEGY
Adopting pessimistic strategy had to limit the di usion of votes which is a result 
of limited voting as well as dividing votes. In order to assess the e ectiveness of this 
strategy averages of the support towards candidates to the Senate from di erent 
parties and the strategy adopted by parties were compiled (table 3). In order to 
eliminate the in$ uence of the general support towards a party in a precinct the 
calculation was based on the di erence between the results obtained by a candidate 
and the results of his party in the Sejm elections in the same precinct. Which means, 
as it was argued above, this parameter has a positive value in the case of LiD and 
the Polish Peasants’ Party but negative in the case of the Civic Platform and the Law 
and Justice. 
In the  rst place, I discuss the in$ uence of a strategy on the support towards 
candidates of a party which adopted such a strategy (bolded values). Adoption of 
a pessimistic strategy was related to an increase in support (calculated in such a way) 
in all parties. Support for the Civic Platform candidate increased, on average, by 3.3 
per cent when the pessimistic strategy was used. In the case of Law and Justice such 
di erence was 6.3 per cent, for LiD 4.3 per cent, and for the Polish Peasants’ Party 
it was 6.1 per cent. For all candidates together, when considering the relations 
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between the party’s results and the results achieved by its candidates in the Senate 
race, an increase in support when a party used a pessimistic strategy was 4.5 per 
cent of votes.
Tab. 3.  e results of pessimistic and optimistic strategies in the Senate elections
 
anaverage result of a Senate candidate compared 
with the results of the Sejm elections no. of cases
Strategy PO PiS LiD PSL
PO – optimistic –8.5% –5.2% 1.3% 2.8% 26
PO – pessimistic –5.2% –8.8% 2.8% 3.3% 15
PiS – optimistic –6.8% –7.5% 1.8% 1.8% 28
PiS – pessimistic –8.8% –1.2% 2.1% 6.2% 13
LiD – optimistic –8.4% –5.9% 0.2% 0.7% 15
LiD – pessimistic –6.8% –6.2% 4.5% 4.7% 26
PSL – optimistic –7.3% –8.4% 1.1% -0.5% 9
PSL – pessimistic –7.5% –5.4% 2.2% 5.6% 32
Source: own estimation based on wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl
Visibly, an adoption of a pessimistic strategy is a rational behaviour for political 
parties which are aware that they will not receive the highest support in a precinct. 
Nonetheless, it has its disadvantages. Some of the voters when faced by an incomplete 
list of the candidates from a party they support, may, in such a situation, give their 
votes to candidates from a di erent party. What is the relationship between a strategy 
of one party and support towards candidates of another party?  e answer is not 
easy since the adoption of this strategy is based on the parties exit situation, that is 
the 2005 results. Nonetheless, direct correlation between strategies used by parties 
are very weak – the value of the coe#  cient does not get higher than 0.25.  e strat-
egies themselves can be then regarded as independent variables. Majority of relations 
between the support for candidates of one party and a strategy of a di erent party 
can be explained by the positions parties take in a two-dimensional scheme of ideo-
logical divisions12 and the $ ow of votes between parties.  e biggest di erence is 
noticed in the case of the Polish Peasants’ Party. Support for this party increases, on 
average, by 4 percentage points when LiD adopts the pessimistic strategy.  is support 
12 R. Markowski, System partyjny, [in:] Demokracja w Polsce 2005–2007, L. Kolarska-
Bobińska, J. Kucharczyk, J. Zbieranek (eds.), Instytut Sprzaw Publicznych, Warszawa 2007, 
p. 168.
72 Jarosław FLIS
increases even more, by 4.4 percentage points, when a pessimistic strategy is adopted 
by Law and Justice. Although it may appear paradoxical as the Law and Justice (Flis 
used PSL – probably a mistake but need to ask) and LiD are placed on two extreme 
ends of the main axis of political di erences13, nonetheless this central position is to 
the advantage of the Polish Peasants’ Party14. However, in the case of the Civic Plat-
form the pessimistic strategy of this party is related to only a small gain (lead) of the 
candidates of the Polish Peasants’ Party (0.5%).
Even if some of these values are a result of apparent dependencies, their totale ect 
is hard to ignore – in precincts where all parties used pessimistic strategies (Gdynia 
and Opole), support for the Polish Peasants’ Party was by 8 percentage points higher 
(a" er considering di! erence of the support in the Sejm race) than in the precincts 
where all parties used optimistic strategies (Piotrków Trybunalski and Toruń). 
While the Polish Peasants’ Party appear as the party of the second choice for some 
of the Law and Justice and LiD voters, the latter seem to be less of a bene& ciary of 
the adoption of pessimistic strategies by other parties. * e di! erence in support for 
LiD candidates when a pessimistic strategy is adopted is the biggest for the Civic 
Platform. It is only 1.5 per cent of votes. In the case of the Polish Peasants’ Party it is 
1.1 per cent. It does not seem that an incomplete list of candidates used by the Law 
and Justice would increase support for LiD. * e di! erence here is only 0.3 per cent 
and can be a result of other variables. * e same di! erence, although a decreasing 
support, is noticed in the support for Law and Justice candidate depending on the 
strategy adopted by LiD. A pessimistic strategy adopted by LiD decreases the support 
for Law and Justice. In the case of the Polish Peasants’ Party there is a visible di! er-
ence. In the precincts where the party adopted a pessimistic strategy, the candidates 
of Law and Justice receive, on average, 3 per cent more votes. It is more di+  cult, 
however, to interpret the fact that in the precincts where the Civic Platform chose 
a pessimistic strategy, the candidates from Law and Justice received a smaller support 
(a similar situation takes place in the case of support for the Civic Platform in pre-
cincts where Law and Justice chose a pessimistic strategy). * is relation has probably 
some apparent dependency a derivative of the overall arrangement of strategies of 
other parties. * is problem can be explained by a analysis path described observations 
can become a basis for a model (troche przeredagowac)
In the end, support for the winning party, the Civic Platform, is to the lowest 
degree dependent on strategies adopted by other parties. In the case of LiD and the 
Polish Peasants’ Party there are small di! erences. A pessimistic strategy adopted by 
13 See: M. Grabowska, Podział postkomunistyczny, Scholar, Warszawa 2004. 
14 J. Flis, Blokowanie list i koalicje w sejmikacj wojewódzkich, [in:] A. Wołek, Władza 
i poli tyka lokalna, OMP, WSB-NLU, Kraków–Nowy Sącz 2008, p. 20.
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LiD is related to a 1.5 per cent increase in support for the Civic Platform candidates 
and a pessimistic strategy of the Polish Peasants’ Party with an even smaller di erence 
(0.2 per cent). 
Paradoxically, the election results of the Polish Peasants’ Party, which created 
a coalition government with the Civic Platform, is only to a very small degree related 
to the strategy of the Civic Platform (and reversely) and can count on the support 
of the electorate of two opposition parties – Law and Justice and LiD – which stand 
at two extreme ends of the political spectrum.
A detailed analysis of the election results in particular precincts shows that parties 
made some poor (poor, weak…??) in their choice of election strategy. Two types of 
mistakes are possible here. First, a party adopts an optimistic strategy in a precinct 
where a pessimistic strategy would increase its chance to obtain a mandate. Second, 
a pessimistic strategy is adopted at the moment when an optimistic strategy would 
increase a chance to win the race. Additionally, in some situations, the election results 
did not depend only on the strategy adopted by the party but also on the  nal choice 
of the strategy adopted by other parties.
In the case of 8 mandates obtained by the Law and Justice there was a chance that 
the party will loose them to the advantage of the Civil Platform. In the case of four 
mandates such a situation was highly probable. In the case of four remaining ones, 
it was less probable. Had a di erent strategy been adopted, Law and Justice could 
have won six mandates which otherwise went to the Civic Platform. In four cases, 
a change in strategy would almost certainly allow Law and Justice to win the race 
while in the case of two mandates it was less probable, but possible.
LiD candidates, who lost the race, could have won three mandates at the cost of 
Law and Justice if the strategy was changed. However, it was only possible, in all cases 
discussed, if the Civic Platform chose a wrong strategy. One of the Polish Peasants’ 
Candidates could have won a race if his party gave up nominating another candidate 
in his precinct. However, in a few precincts candidates of a smaller party used the 
pessimistic strategy and lost by a hair’s with the candidates of larger parties.
 e essence of the less obvious consequences of adopting di erent strategies by 
parties is the success of Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz.  is success resulted from the 
fact that in the precinct of Białystok three parties, the Civic Platform, LiD, and the 
Polish Peasants’ Party, chose a pessimistic strategy.  erefore, an independent can-
didate could be a candidate of a third choice for supporters of all three parties. 
Together, in the Sejm race, these parties received 56% of support. Even if one in every 
three voters gave up his/her right to make a third vote, there are still 38 per cent of 
votes le .  is is exactly the support received by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Without 
belittling his position in the region, his success would be, by far, less probable in any 
di erent system. Another candidate, a former Speaker of the House – Marek Jurek 
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– ran in a precinct where all parties used an optimistic strategy and closed for him 
the door that allowed Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz to enter the Senate.
9. SUMMARY – A MODEL OF A SENATE VOTING
! e analysis leads to a real model of relations between di erent phenomena tak-
ing place in block voting (# gure 3). ! e e ects that accompany block voting at the 
level of voters’ behaviour is: # rst, limited voting, second, division of votes. Limited 
voting means making less votes than the election law allows while division of votes 
means lack of party loyalty and voting for candidates from di erent political parties. 
Each of these mechanisms, which from the perspective of a political party is a found 
phenommenon leads to a dilemma: should a pessimistic strategy be used? Adopting 
such a strategy is very rational. It prevents a di usion in votes and losing mandates 
to the advantage of parties whose results are only slightly smaller or who themselves 
adopted a pessimistic strategy.
Rys. 3. A Model of Dilemmas in Block Voting
Source: own work.
A decision to limit the number of candidates leads to dilemmas among loyal and 
political savvy voters. While # nding a smaller number of candidates on the list than 
his/her votes allow, a voter can adopt one of two strategies. ! e # rst one is limited 
voting, meaning not using all his/her votes by not voting for candidates from other 
parties. ! e second one is division of votes and voting for a candidate from another 
party. In this context it becomes visible that an adoption of a pessimistic strategy by 
a political party enforces two phenomena which were the basis to choose such 
a strategy. ! is leads to a feedback since the more voters use limited voting or divide 
their votes, the more important it becomes for the party to choose a strategy. ! at is 
why when a pessimistic strategy is used in a precinct where an optimistic strategy 
could have been used, then a party increases a chance of the competing party to win 
additional votes.
limited voting
dividing
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An analysis of the Senate race results does not allow for a statement that in these 
elections the so-called psychological e ect, meaning a need to vote for a wining 
candidate, the one who has the highest chance to win the mandate, plays a role.  e 
fact that the LiD and Polish Peasants’ Party candidates received a larger support than 
their parties did in the Sejm race allows a statement that voters were more prone to 
candidates of these two parties than they would have been in a proportional voting 
system. Such a situation could be in uenced by the fact that voters these races as less 
important in the  ght for the executive power, which, as Cox argues, is one of the key 
impulses in the direction of the two-party system.15 In Poland, such an impulse is 
visible in the Sejm race but not in the Senate race. Second, an opportunity to make 
more votes encourages voters to divide them in order to express their indecisiveness 
or lack of straight party identi cation.  ird, this is a result of dilemmas faced by 
voters of larger parties in the face of adopting by parties pessimistic strategies. 
An attempt to guess if results were the same if the Senate race would decide on 
who will govern is unfortunately a pure speculation. Nonetheless, in the block elec-
tion system, voters do not follow the direction described as the Duveger’s law16. 
Conclusions of this analysis partially con rm the  ndings of Jack Haman that Poland 
has as quasi-proportional electoral system. Candidates from weaker parties have 
a chance to get into the Parliament in precincts where their party is dominated by 
other parties. 
Unquestionably, with the current shape of the party system and current divisions 
on the political scene, similarly as it was in the previous elections, the election system 
guarantees a straight (?) majority in this race. However, this is a result of purely 
mathematical calculations and not a psychological need recorded among voters to 
support candidates who have a higher chance to win.
15 G.W. Cox, Making Votes Count…, op.cit., pp. 190–192
16 Duverger M. Political Parties, 1954, from: Making Votes Count…, op.cit.
